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Justifying war appears to be a hopeless task: at the same time necessary and impossible. Perhaps the first part – necessary – was the source of a need to establish “Just War Theory,” a theoretical tool to provide justifi-
catory reasons for employing force in cases deemed needed. However, we 
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Abstract
The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult 
to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification 
and justness (“justice”) are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the 
nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution (through adequate definitions), the 
second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is 
the crucial part of “just war theory.” However, “just war theory,” somewhat Manichean 
in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces 
warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a 
right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and 
destroys the collective character of warfare (reducing it to an incomprehensible individual 
level, as if a group of people entered a battle in hopes of finding another group of people 
willing to respond). Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the 
definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which 
there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not 
justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo 
ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed 
in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over 
the future, predictability (obtained through laws), is a feature of peace. This might imply 
that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation 
of this inability (which could simply be incompetence, or because peace, as a specific 
articulation of distribution of social power, is not tenable anymore) forms the justification 
of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to 
it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various 
parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time (and expressed in customary and 
legal rules of warfare), with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. 
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can ask: What do we really mean by the term “justifying?” What is there to 
be justified, what can be justified, and what do we want to justify? In his book 
Arguing about the War, Michael Walzer states: 
The theory of just war began in the service of the powers. At 
least it is how I [i.e. Walzer] interpret Augustine’s achievement: 
He [Augustine] replaced the radical refusal of Christian pacifists 
with the active ministry of the Christian soldier.” And then he [i.e. 
Walzer] continues: “Now pious Christians could fight on behalf 
of the worldly city, for the sake of imperial peace.1
The word “ministry” here equals to “serving,” of course; and it is a le-
gitimate, justified, and consecrated kind of serving for the sake of peace, a 
matter of duty. The rest is rather obvious and seemingly convincing; to quote 
again another piece of Michael Walzer: “How can it be wrong to do what is 
right?”2
But we can also reverse the phrasing of this question: “How can it be 
right to do what is wrong?”
In justifying or explaining war, there are two distinct lines (or levels) of 
issues, indicating two different sets of problems, overlapping but not concur-
rent with the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello.3 One of these 
lines deals with the specific nature of war as a specific practice; the other 
refers to the purpose of it. We shall analyze both these lines in the course of 
this text.
However, there is no need to consider justice as a sole and ultimate jus-
tification of war in either of these lines, in other words that war has to be just 
in order to be justified, in the sense, assumed within just war theory. Wars 
are fought for reasons that certainly could and should be evaluated for their 
justness, but justice is not the primary reason for starting a war. Due to that 
reason, there is a conflict which cannot be resolved otherwise, and with con-
current mutual consent the conflict cannot remain unresolved.
In this sense, beginning a war is entirely a matter of freedom, and it can 
be avoided by rejecting the second part of this clause (either by deciding not 
to attack, or to surrender immediately upon being attacked). Afterwards, it 
1 Michael Walzer, “The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success),” in Arguing 
about War, ed. Michael Walzer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 3-22 [italics by the 
author].
2 Michael Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
2, no. 2 (1973): 160-80.
3 Ius ad bellum is the justification of starting or entering into a war, while ius in bello defines 
what is the acceptable or permissible conduct within a war.
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becomes an event burdened by many kinds of necessities, many unpredict-
ed, or not predictable at the starting point. In all possible combinations, the 
result might be unjust; but even if it is just, the justice there only comes 
afterwards, and even then it depends on the definition of what’s taken as 
“peace” in any particular evaluation. The resolution of the conflict should 
be a restored or new peace, and its stipulation has decisive impact on what 
will be taken as the description of justice in any concrete case. If “peace” 
is the articulation of the accepted or recognized distribution of power in a 
particular society,4 we may say that peace is the object of war for both sides, 
implying that a content-wise definition of justice depends on the definition of 
this articulation: what constitutes a matter of legitimate freedom depends on 
what is accepted as “peace.” 
It follows that there are no just wars as such (although war is usually 
perceived as such from both sides, in a similar manner as with perception of 
revenge). An attack, and even a defense, might be unjust, as well as any par-
ticular act or practice employed in a war, and some wars might contain more 
such unjust parts than some other wars. Moreover, taking into consideration 
that the definition of war contains acceptance of the risk and readiness to be 
killed and even to kill, war is obviously an unfortunate and bad state of affairs 
that should be avoided. The ultimate nature of that risk, unlike for example 
the risk to be killed in public transportation (nobody avoids going to work be-
cause of the actuality of such a risk), is an indicator that all wars are cases of 
political failure; and, regarding those who must face the choices they would 
rather avoid, we say that all wars are unjust. But this does not imply that they 
are necessarily unjustified. 
To be “just” and to be “justified” is not the same. Everything we do is justi-
fied by some reasons, and most of them are morally neutral, i.e. morally permis-
sible (matter of legitimate freedom as it is not being morally impermissible, i.e. 
is not either “just” or “unjust”). Talking about justice in such morally neutral 
situations is an indicator of unfounded assignation of blame to the side desig-
nated as “unjust.” Moreover, on the motivational level, nothing we do, except 
that which is directly connected with what we must morally blame, is done for 
the sake of justice – our acts are based on ends (goals or purposes), which are 
in turn based on our desires and interests. The question of justice comes only 
retroactively, when something wrong has been done. And moral wrongness 
depends on the fact that something has been done with wrong intention. When 
others are at stake this might mean the lack of consent. However, mutual con-
4 Cf. Jovan Babić, “The Structure of Peace,” in World Governance. Do We Need It, Is It Possible, 
What Could It (All) Mean?, ed. Jovan Babić, and Petar Bojanić, 200-212 (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). 
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sent, which is a part of definition of war, is not lacking in this manner.5 Even in 
the case where justice is a triggering6 reason for starting a war, i.e. for attack-
ing,7 its overall justness will depend on the evaluation of what has been done in 
the end. Unjust realization of perfectly just goals will be unjust. There is no way 
that justice can justify something in advance, or give an imprimatur to realize 
some ends by any means.
I.
The first level of justification refers to the set of problems regarding the 
nature of warfare as a specific activity, which is connected with high risks 
regarding basic human values of life and bodily integrity. War comes with 
the risk of getting killed (which is not a very specific risk here, indeed, as it is 
characteristic of many, probably most or all, other human activities as well),8 
5 This entails that some war actions, or even some wars, do not fit the normative definition of 
war given here. The part of that definition relevant here is the existence of some initial equality, 
i.e. some possibility of success for both sides (such prospect is a necessary condition for the 
rationality of any action; otherwise it will be indiscernible from mere conceiving, fantasizing 
and wishful thinking). Also, it entails that those actions that are not intended for the resolution 
of the conflict (which requires preservation of the existence of the sides in the conflict), like 
extermination or annihilation, also do not fit the normative definition of war. Conflict cannot 
be “solved” by destroying one side of it. Cf. Michael Walzer, “World War II: Why Was This War 
Different?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971): 3-21. [World War II produced a kind of 
conceptual confusion regarding the concept of war, which subsequently gave a strong support 
to crusade-like features of just war theory to evolve to the point where, self-contradictory, 
similar kind of logic as the one present in the constitution of World War II has been used as a 
tool of justification (e.g. in justifying foreign armed intervention or, even more, in the doctrine 
of “responsibility to protect”)].
6 Many phenomena are designated as “wars” while they are not. For example, the “Korean 
war” was a military intervention, and was a stricto sensu war in part regarding only the con-
flict between USA and China. An armed conflict which starts for reasons of justice, and not 
of self-defense, would also belong in this kind of category. WW II, which might come to the 
mind, only evolved into a war where justice played such an important role (although that role 
also had its clear propagandistic and military purposes); in the beginning, it was a matter of 
defense of those who were attacked. That defense would be justified even if the attack was not 
as vicious as it subsequently proved to be. 
7 The most common reason for attacking is an empirical matter. It is a complex issue, much 
more than it is presumed to be in the theory of just war. For example, Thucydides suggested 
that the reason for the Peloponnesian War was Sparta’s fear for the growing power of its op-
ponent, Athens. On the intuitive level the most probable triggering reason for attacking (as 
well as in the rest of nature) is the perception of the other as weak (or weaker). It should be 
corroborated empirically to see if most, or all, wars started with the belief that the attackers 
are stronger and the attacked side weaker. 
8 Risk of being killed in war is probably considerably higher than the risk of being killed in public 
traffic, and certainly much higher than being killed by taking medication, but the nature of that 
risk is pretty much the same – it is the result of previous decision-making and the uncertainty 
ingrained in realization of what’s decided despite the fact that there is such a risk. 
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but also the risk of intentional killing, which is a really peculiar feature of war 
with obvious moral importance. 
There is a very peculiar feature of both of these risks in the context of 
war, reciprocity: the risk to be killed is reciprocally transferred from one war 
ringside to the other side as a mutual threat; the risk to kill is also distributed 
reciprocally in the same way. That’s why killing in war might not be morally 
impermissible. Two aspects seem to be relevant here. First, although killing is 
an inherent part of war, it is not its aim: the aim is the victory or, in Clause-
witzian terms, compelling the adversary to fulfill our will.9 Killing might come 
as a result of this process, either accidentally or, specifically, in a (mutually 
reciprocal) blackmailing scheme: a preparedness to be killed and kill is crucial 
part of the means to convince the opponent of the seriousness of our intent 
to compel them to give up their will and accept ours. Second, reciprocity se-
cures mutual consent, a kind of contractarian transfer of obligation to treat 
the other side as an enemy, but not as a criminal. Both sides accepted the war 
as a decision-making rule; they agreed that a conflict that cannot be resolved 
otherwise should not remain unresolved and so took and accepted not only 
the risk to be killed, as a universal risk present virtually in all human activities 
(the fact of vulnerability), but also the risk to kill if that proves to be neces-
sary to accomplish the goal. 
Both of these risks are distributed symmetrically and reciprocally. Being 
killed in such a scheme is not something unjust, something that, as such, 
should be prosecuted and punished, or avenged (or retaliated against). This 
shows that killing in war is not an ordinary killing which contains an offense, 
but it is a kind of legitimate, mutually agreed, collective act. It is not an act 
of an individual as such, a soldier as a particular person with his own private 
interests and concerns, but an act of the warring army, wherein an individual 
is doing what is defined by the rules of war as a specific decision-making rule. 
What a particular soldier is doing is considered part of collective endeavor, in 
a very complex scheme in which the responsibility is articulated as a function 
of the individual within collective: responsibility is constrained and defined by 
that function.10A soldier, or a military unit, is a part of an army as a collective 
9 Cf. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. James John Graham (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 
101: “War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”
10 If not, if a soldier is doing something not articulated within the function performed in a 
collective scheme, then his responsibility will be purely individual, probably a war crime, or 
possibly an act of heroism beyond any military task or duty. Although all responsibilities are 
individual, individual responsibility, defined as independent of the military function that an 
individual performs, is outside the scheme of reciprocity and does not belong to war as a war 
activity; it is a private enterprise of the individual for which she is directly responsible. If reci-
procity cannot apply (like in e.g. war crimes) it should not be considered to be part of war as 
the activity to resolve a conflict over what should be recognized as “peace” (and, accordingly, 
should be punished). 
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entity whose identity is irreducible to a set of individuals. Soldiers who kill in 
war are not doing so as individuals, but exclusively as members of a warring 
side, otherwise it would not be a part of war but would be a criminal act.11
It is quite obvious that battles are symmetrical: both sides pose mortal 
threat to each other, and the situation resembles to Kant’s picture of a ship-
wreck, where “there can be no penal law that would assign the death penalty 
to someone in a shipwreck who, in order to save his own life, shoves another, 
whose life is equally in danger, off a plank on which he had saved himself.”12 
According to this picture, war is certainly a very bad, ugly and undesirable 
situation, something that nobody would prefer. At the same time, it is a situ-
ation anyone can find themselves in, especially if one is not vigilant enough, 
but also sometimes despite all possible vigilance. 
Additionally, as a matter of fact, this is not all we mean by the word 
“war.” It might be a description of a most typical situation in which partici-
pants in a war may find themselves in, but there is a part of the concept of war 
which is entirely missing here: how did this situation occur in the first place 
(how did it happen that they found themselves in such a situation)? Soldiers 
in the middle of the battle may epitomize the war and be our first association 
of it, but we are searching for a serious and responsible analysis of an import-
ant phenomenon, and thus we cannot take a typical, even central part of the 
picture and confuse it with the whole. In Kant’s picture, there was a shipwreck 
happening prior to the situation. The two actors fell in the water, swam and 
saw the log in the distance, and recognized the log as a place where they 
could find their salvation. 
The point of the story begins only after all of that. Similarly, in the context 
of our question about participants in a war, the war had already started. This war 
is part of existing (actual) reality around them, with all relevant ingredients: the 
changed circumstances (the presence of actual, not only possible, threats), the 
suspension of many rules of ordinary life (including some important laws, or their 
parts), changed premises and criteria of evaluation in whatever one is doing, etc. 
The question of whether this war should have started (first question) is different 
from the question what to do now after it has started (the second question). The 
reason why it started is only of a delayed importance to those finding themselves 
within a war. They have to fight first, and investigate later, if there is a chance 
for it. I used to have students who served in the Gulf war, and later in Iraq and 
11 This description opens a room for a good delineation between warfare and war crimes, the 
latter being all those acts which have no specific military purpose: although both kinds of acts 
are bad and negative, as killings, killing in war is not considered as a murder unless it is militar-
ily senseless or not militarily needed.  
12 Cf. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 28 [standard pagination by the edition of Preussischen Akademie, Ber-
lin: Bd. VI, S. 235].
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Afghanistan, and they describe their experiences in a way in which a survivor of 
a shipwreck might do: him or me, quite independently of the fact that “he” is a 
total stranger, someone about whom they didn’t know anything at all, including 
anything of their being justified, or “justified” in being there, on the opposite side. 
You may respond that in many situations this picture is not accurate. The 
soldiers are not shipwreck castaways who just happened to find themselves in 
a bad situation. They can calculate the risks, and avoid entering the situation 
in the first place. Igor Primoratz gives a detailed depiction of such a calcula-
tion in one of his articles.13 The point he makes could, in a certain sense, be 
right; there should always be an option to avoid any risk (nothing we do is in 
advance necessary and for that matter unavoidable). The shipwrecked people 
could simply never go on the journey, and if they didn’t, they certainly would 
never find themselves in such an ugly and humiliating situation like fighting 
for a log in cold open water. But the price for that would be to abandon 
everything connected with the journey in any real terms. In a way, it is equiv-
alent to a capitulation in advance, and soon we will come to this matter. It 
would be better for those who suffered in a car accident that they had stayed 
home, of course, but it seems unfair to say that their calculation to do other-
wise was not correct and hence blamable. 
Here we may have a feeling of moral absurdity: both people involved 
know that the survivor won’t be able to avoid looking in the mirror and won-
dering what is there after the success (i.e. survival); and this is, at least in my 
impression, the main issue with survivors and the moral risks connected with 
survival: did I deserve to be the one who made it? And they would take “me” 
(themselves) in the context of whatever they think they deserve in their whole 
life before, and prospectively after that point in time, not only the specifics 
of that particular situation. They may then feel that they should be grateful; 
but to – what? Destiny? It is necessarily humiliating to be dependent on such 
an accidental set of circumstances in a situation that is not determined by 
natural causes. It seems to me that this is why survivors may feel a need to 
be able to say that it was necessary despite being seemingly impossible. They 
ask themselves the Walzerian question: “How can it be wrong to do what is 
right?”
II.
A quite different line of argumentation, indicating a different set of problems, 
is the other characteristic of war: in reality, it functions as a decision-making 
rule; a very peculiar one, which is not, based on the strengths of reasons used 
13 Igor Primoratz, “Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory: Some Issues of Responsibility,” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 5, no. 2 (2002): 221-43.  
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in arguments, like polemics and debates, but on the strength of pure force as 
such.14 Based on this rule, the purpose of the institution of war is to reach a 
decision in matters where other means of reaching the decision have failed; 
and the constitutive rule of this institution is victory. 
In principle there are two points of special interest here: the starting 
point, and the point of resolution. Both these points have a property extreme-
ly important for a serious analysis of war: they change the reality and the 
framework, scope and context in which everything that follows will unfold 
– and also necessarily change the most relevant criteria of applicable eval-
uations of all decisions and acts performed. The scope of possible decisions 
changes cardinally after each of these irreversible points. Many things, which 
could have been decided upon before such a point is reached, will no longer 
be an option afterwards. The time before and the time after each of these 
points, in both what is the reality and what are the criteria of evaluation of 
what counts as legitimate and valid, are different. This is the line of thought 
on which I want to focus more on in this paper. 
III.
What does it mean that the constitutive rule of war is victory? Isn’t war only 
a matter of fighting and killing? If we look more closely, we may notice that 
in the beginning of war both sides show, and not only on a declaratory level, 
signs of desiring or hoping to avoid the coming conflict: the attacked side 
hopes not to be attacked, and the attacker hopes that victory will come in a 
fast and easy manner.15
We may have difficulties with the second hope – which would be realized 
if the attacked side surrenders quickly, presumably instantaneously – except 
if we consider the attacked side to be deserving the attack, and the attacker 
justified; but such a case would not fit into what we consider to be a war, and 
such an event should not even be called war. It would be police action, an act 
of punishment, or maybe an act of revenge or retaliation, perhaps too small 
and one-sided to be designated as a war. We can however say that one crucial 
feature of war as a decision-making procedure is absent in this case, and that 
14 However, strength of reasons as a way to solve disagreement in an argument functions 
only as a regulative rule; such strength does not produce a new reality, one independent of 
the already existing factuality in which the reasons find their strength (the truth of the facts). 
Contrary to this, war understood as a decision-making rule includes a rule which is not only 
regulative, but also constitutive, opening a room to a new reality upon employment of that 
rule (victory defines what the laws will be after the war).  
15 There is an interesting difference between possible desiring and (always present) hoping: it 
is possible that the attacker might desire not to have to attack in the first place, but there is 
no sense in saying that they hoped not to have to attack at all – except in cases in which the 
attack is a form of defense. 
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is a presumed initial equality of adversaries. This means that the victory is 
not the right word to describe what happens: we cannot say that police was 
victorious in a specific clash with criminals, except in a metaphorical sense. It 
seems more appropriate to say that police was successful. It seems that initial 
equality is part of the definition of war, or pre-supposition of its possibility, 
as it is also part of the definition of justice. 
In Thucydides we read: “Justice is enforced only among those who can be 
equally constrained by it;” or, in another translation: “The standard of justice 
depends on the equality of power to compel.”16 However, equality is not as 
easy a concept as it may seem to be. In Hobbes we read that even the weak-
est, and not necessarily the brightest one, can kill the strongest and brightest 
through cunning.17 It seems that determination plays greater role than actual 
magnitude of available force. Finns succeeded to defend themselves against 
the Soviets in 1939-40, despite the huge inequality of strength; only a few 
years later, the Soviets defeated the strongest military power of that time, 
Germany, in a battle much bigger than the Finish episode. Moreover, the US 
lost in Vietnam. So, while we may feel some optimism that reducing equality 
might reduce the risk of war, this approach is not very promising. I will return 
to the issue of this inequality later, as it designates what we call “peace,” as a 
clear and conclusive demarcation of two parts of our freedom, the legitimate 
one and the part which is forbidden. An unjust peace will always have the 
tendency and sometimes the capacity to produce war. 
Then there is the first hope, the hope not to be attacked in the first place. 
If that was the case, there would be no war. Unfortunately, one cannot be 
sure that such an outcome will still happen regardless of the strength of the 
wish (or the hope). How can you be sure? It seems that the only viable strate-
gy is to prepare for defense and attempt to deter a possible attack. And here 
is the crux of our issue. War could be easily avoided if the attacked side ca-
pitulated instantly. That seems to be the only way to avoid any war without 
any further constraint.
We can easily imagine such an option in any particular situation, whereas 
it seems impossible to conceive that attacks simply cannot occur, that they 
somehow won’t ever happen. We cannot conceive the impossibility of attack-
ing. 
But if we cannot conceive the impossibility of attacking, why cannot 
we conceive universal instantaneous capitulation as a spontaneous answer 
to any attack? It is still possible in any particular case. Why cannot it be uni-
16 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Walter Blanco (New York: W. W. Norton & Com-
pany, 1998), 227, [5:89]. For another translation see Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian 
War, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 402.
17 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 74. 
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versalized? What is it so precious in defense or victory that prevents us to do 
this? What is the worth of victory? 
IV.
Before answering that question, we may notice that the very concept of vic-
tory depends on the fact that victory is not secured in advance: without at 
least some uncertainty of the outcome, there is no real sense in speaking of 
“victory.” The main, essential, point here lies in what “in advance” means. In 
time-related sense, the phrase “in advance” means that we can predict what 
will, or at least what should, happen. But there is an important difference 
between the two (between what will happen, and what should happen). As 
we shall see, both are uncertain, as the future is uncertain in both factual and 
normative sense. It is not certain what will happen, and neither is what should 
happen. This is the essence of victory: that it brings up for debate the defini-
tion of the legitimate state of affairs, the peace. Also, that definition also is 
not given in advance. It is the object of conflict and fighting. In war there is 
no factual control of what will happen in the future time. 
However, there is a sense in which what should happen is, and has to be, 
the matter of a consensus in advance, actually two such consensuses – for 
each side, a consensus that “our side” should win. This consensus has a huge 
mobilizing impact. The determination to believe what should happen enforc-
es the deciders to enter war at all, whether to attack or to attempt defense. 
Both sides have symmetrical position in this regard. If it is not the case that 
either side could win, what is happening is not war but something else (police 
action, robbery, etc.). Again, war is a state of affairs in which we have no 
normative control of our future time.
So, the lack of control over the future seems to be an essential feature 
of war, both in factual and normative sense. 
The first, factual sense implies temporariness of war. War is a temporary 
state of affairs, a state that should pass and end with the victory of one side, 
therefore establishing peace as a permanent state of affairs. Peace will be a 
state of affairs where we have both the factual and normative control of our 
future time, and this is something that victory can bring. Factual control of 
the future in the state of peace is based in normative control of the future 
contained in the definition of that particular peace: what should not be done, 
as defined by accepted laws. Peace will be, as it is, a specific articulation of 
the distribution of power, where laws will be established, demarcating pre-
cisely which part of our freedom has been legitimized and which not. It will 
still fit into the scheme which differentiates war from peace, analogously to 
the difference between death (or, as a matter of fact, the risk of death) and 
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life; and it will be in accordance with an operative definition of life as an ac-
tivity of free and unhindered process of setting goals and attempting to real-
ize them, which means that life requires peace for this prospect of unhindered 
free living. In this scheme, war looks like a dangerous and hazardous road 
which eventually leads to peace. By attaining peace the job is done, and vic-
tory determines what is right and what is not. The legitimate distribution of 
power has been established; it has become valid through the act of its accep-
tance. The result is consensus on what the laws and ways of life will look like. 
The second sense of lack of control of the future, the normative one, is more 
interesting, politically and morally. It cannot be described simply by pointing 
to its temporariness, by saying that it will pass. It is a deep disagreement about 
what should be the outcome of the war. This looks like a redundant thing to say, 
but it is somehow very frequently left out from the logic of reasoning about 
war. The complex story of moral equality of soldiers belongs here. Here is the 
terrain where the uncertainty of victory plays a very special role. In essence, it 
is the same role that consensus plays in the act of establishing laws and their 
validity: consensus must be free to be valid, which means that there has to be 
a possibility of rejection. Having in mind the question posed in the beginning 
of the paper, how to justify what seems to be unjustifiable, here we encounter 
that possibility: what could be a stronger argument for the justification of a 
conflict than the absence or lack of consent? It seems really obvious: if there is 
no consent in cases where consent is necessary, it seems that the only possible 
response must be to restore or establish it. 
Victory has the logical structure of consent, which is not visible at first 
and is frequently overlooked.18 The uncertainty in victory contains the possi-
bility that either side in the conflict could lose, which is a part of the fact that 
before victory both sides are aspirants to being in the right. Winning is the 
focus, but without accepting the possibility of losing there can be no victory, 
and no war. This, importantly, establishes a normative reciprocity of expecta-
tions: each side expects that the other side will be defeated. 
18 It may be objected that defeat is not something accepted voluntarily, but the constitutive 
rule of war says just the opposite: the fact that you accepted to play that game should show 
that there is a point at which you are prepared to accept capitulation. Capitulation is the last 
means of defense, and it has to be ingrained in the rule: it means that there are some limits 
to victors. The articulation of these limits is very important part of how wars should settle 
the disputes for which both sides decided to be solved despite the fact that they cannot be 
solved peacefully. According to Kant, for example (and this seems to me to be the very best 
definition, or articulation, of capitulation), there are three conditions for a valid capitulation 
(Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals VI, §57-58): the defeated cannot be annihilated, humiliated 
or punished. These are the conditions that make the acceptance of capitulation a form of 
consent, based in original acceptance to settle the dispute by war. This preserves the freedom 
to enter war in the first place even in its possibly non-victorious end, keeping the possibility to 
lose open, and implying that victory is not, as it cannot be, necessary. 
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There are two logical features of this that are important to emphasize. 
First, it is the nature of freedom (and also its price) to proclaim the aspiration 
to propose and attempt to determine a different definition of right without 
this being defined as a criminal activity (at least not in a legal sense – other-
wise what one side is doing would have to be designated as criminal). Second, 
this story is strictly within the ius ad bellum scheme, and has not yet anything 
to do with what we may find, or anything resembling arguments belonging 
to ius in bello. Both of these aspects could easily be overlooked in the just 
war theory. Regarding the first aspect, if validity of a normative structure of 
a state of affairs depends on consent, it implies a choice, i.e. freedom. Re-
garding the second aspect, the content of ius in bello will depend on various 
beliefs, customs, habits, sensitivities, and established expectations.
This is a specific feature which reflects the nature of ius ad bellum. This 
feature is reciprocity, a type of a mutual relationship which safeguards both 
sides from those actions that would destroy the relationship. This is one of 
those points where influence goes from ius ad bellum to ius in bello, which is 
not reducible to the final outcome, victory. Both sides recognize the same or 
similar set of prohibitions, requiring that the adversary won’t be destroyed, 
annihilated or humiliated to the point at which it would not be capable of 
restoring its identity and nature. This aspect is very often absent from the 
contemporary, as well as old, interpretations of just war theory, which usual-
ly denies the rights necessary to establish this reciprocity and minimal respect 
to the other side. A part of the problem in interpreting terrorism, or antiter-
rorism, lies in shortcomings like these. 
There is an important difference between soldiers and policemen, be-
tween an army and the police, and consequently between war and police ac-
tion. Assumption that there is no such difference would lead to a morally 
risky practice of labeling wars as “just” and “unjust” on a regular basis.19 
The attacking army must be confronted with a defense, which is necessarily 
a counter-attack. However, the soldiers of the attacking army are not an ag-
gregate of individuals, like a gang of robbers, which has decided on its own 
to move and attack. This does not make their attack just, of course, but the 
causes of war are normally very far from them, as the decisions are also very 
far from them. In the battlefield the unpredictability of the outcome, accep-
tance of the rules of the game, and the reciprocity which follows make the 
19 Cf. e.g. Jeff McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War,” in Just and Unjust War-
riors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, ed. David Rodin, and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 19. Also Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Philosophia 
34, no. 1 (2006): 23-41, 23. However, Michael Walzer dissents: cf. Michael Walzer, Just and 
Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 
41: “Without the equal right to kill, war as a rule-governed activity would disappear and be 
replaced by crime and punishment, by evil conspiracies and military law enforcement.”
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“cause” of both sides prima facie right. This is contrary to what for example 
Primoratz would say: “For there are wars in which one side is fighting for a 
just and the other for an unjust cause; there are wars in which both sides are 
fighting for an unjust cause; but there are no wars in which both sides’ causes 
are just.”20 On the contrary, most wars are precisely such that both sides have 
some prima facie good reasons on their side. There is a valid dispute, but they 
are not able to resolve the dispute by other means, and they are not prepared 
to leave it unsolved. 
The lack of the ability to resolve a dispute by arguments does not imply 
anything regarding the causes of the dispute. Of course, it is possible that 
both sides have unjust causes for starting the conflict, but to the extent of 
that being the case, it is not very interesting. If both sides have, or one side 
has, only bad reasons for the action, there would not be a moral problem 
there. The case in which one side has only wrong reasons, based on unjust 
causes, would be tragic if this side wins. The humiliation contained in help-
lessness and despair may last for generations. The vanquished side might nev-
er be able to accept the result, and peace could not be truly attained – the 
result would be a prolonged truce without a valid closing. The case in which 
both sides have only wrong reasons is more than tragic, it is morally absurd. 
In both of these cases war is a crime, and just an ordinary one, morally sim-
ple and not worthy of much discussion. In both of these two cases foreign 
military intervention, if possible, would be fully justified or even obligatory. 
Should we, in fact, even call these cases wars? In the case where only one side 
is just as to the right of defense, this would create a clear right to employ 
warfare as a means in countering the attack, but the crucial part of the defini-
tion of war would be lacking: the consent to accept the result of war as just 
and as the basis of a new peace, which is the lawful state of affairs. Some wars 
certainly are of this kind, even big ones, like World War II. 
The really interesting and morally relevant cases are those where both 
sides have a legitimate right in what they are fighting for. Most civil wars are 
such, they are just “normal,” regular21 wars, which fill in the gap of the capac-
ity to make the important decision.
20 Cf. Primoratz, “Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory,” 228.
21 Cf. Raphaël Fulgosius, “In primam Pandectarum partem Commentaria,” ad Dig., 1, 1, 5, 
trans. Peter Haggenmacher, quoted in The Ethics of War, Classic and Contemporary Readings, 
ed. Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 
228; cf. also Gregory Reichberg, “Just War and Regular War: Competing Paradigms,” in Just 
and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, ed. David Rodin, and Henry Shue, 
193-213 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter Haggenmacher, “Just War and Regu-
lar War in Sixteenth Century Spanish Doctrine,” International Review of the Red Cross 32, no. 
290 (1992): 434-45.
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V.
The thesis that one side must be wrong is obscure.22 In one sense the war 
should end, and one side should be defeated, and according to the rule,23 
this side should be found to be wrong. On the other hand, the victorious 
side in a war cannot be determined ahead of time; and if victory has been 
accepted as the constitutive rule of the game, this also means that it is 
impossible to determine who is right in advance. If that, i.e. in advance de-
termining who is right, was possible, it would reduce war to police action. 
Let me forgo this argumentation and focus on two other issues of direct im-
portance. One is the issue of why it is not possible to capitulate in advance, 
based on the right of defense, the other is the relationship between ius ad 
bellum and ius in bello, regarding the causes of war and the question if ius in 
bello depends on ius ad bellum in this way. 
Capitulation is especially interesting. As I have said before, both sides 
hope to avoid war, but neither of them would give up and abandon what 
they are fighting for. As Thucydides points out, hope requires resources. 
These are resources which enable to avoid the war, or to win it. One way 
to avoid it would be not to have or not to produce reasons to be attacked. 
But how can you provide for that? Hope is not enough, and hope might be 
self-deceiving. Thucydides states that: “In times of danger hope is a com-
fort that can hurt you, but won’t destroy you if you have plenty of other 
resources.”24 One such resource could be becoming a member of a club 
consisting of those who are powerful enough; this is the famous “Doyle’s 
Law:”25 that “democratic states don’t war against each other.”26 This means 
not only that “democratic states” are strong, but also that they are the 
strongest ones, as Pericles suggested – according to Thucydides – in the 
famous “Funeral Oration.”27
22 The question is: why is it not enough to say that one, or both, side(s) might be wrong? Why 
is it necessary to say that one side must be wrong (with the hidden implication that it is, on 
careful scrutiny, knowable in advance)? 
23 “According to the rule” implies that it cannot be known in advance who will win, which 
implies quite different meaning of the word “wrong” from the hypothesis presumed in just war 
theory, which is that war is the activity of re-establishing impaired status quo ante (and where 
“wrongness” has been defined, legalistically, as the violation of the then present, existing, 
law). 
24 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 5:103. 
25 As named by late Burleigh Wilkins in one of his papers. 
26 Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 
(1986): 1151-1169.
27 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 2:39.
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VI.
The other, and most common, resource of this hope is preparation for defense. 
Seriousness in determination in this is part of legislative structure: a matter 
of authorization to enforce laws. If a state has no intention to defend its 
constitution and laws, its authorization to enforce them is no longer evident. 
So, it seems that capitulation in advance is not possible based on rather pro-
cedural and logical reasons. It is not possible to be logical because giving up 
in advance wouldn’t be capitulation; and it is not possible to be procedural, 
because the decision to defend the legal status quo is part of the status quo.
So, there is no need for a particular decision regarding defense, whereas 
such a decision is required for capitulation. The reasons in these two situations 
are of very different kind: reasons for defense are principled reasons, based 
on the existence of some rights and they are independent of the prospect of 
success. (These reasons are very peculiar and perhaps couldn’t be conclusive 
as such, but still they are different from all so called prudential reasons). 
Reasons to capitulate are different, they are prudential, they are dependent 
on the prospects of success (in defense), and might imply a moral duty to 
capitulate, as a matter of political and moral responsibility. Both capitulation 
and rejection of capitulation are among those irreversible points after which 
the reality is changed, along with all the relevant parameters for evaluation 
in our search for justification. 
Before we proceed further, let us see what I mean by saying that capit-
ulation in advance is not possible. Logically, there are only two options for 
conceiving a world without war. One is the absence of freedom, in which case 
everything would be necessarily determined by absolute, hard determinism, 
automatically or mechanically. The other is a scheme within which every at-
tack would be followed by an immediate capitulation. We may rule out the 
first as not interesting for the topic under discussion, as we cannot conceive 
of ourselves as not being free.
The second provokes a question: how immediate would this capitulation 
in advance be? It could be conceived as a scheme in which the attacked party 
has lived peacefully in the hope not to be attacked, but with a preparedness 
to surrender immediately if the attack occurred. This readiness and prepared-
ness would go before immediacy: it would be a capitulation in advance. This 
could be conceived only in a world in which pacifism (a very strong version of 
it) is a truly universal world religion accepted by everyone. 
It would be a strange world: forbidding defense and allowing attacks. 
You may protest: why not forbid attacks too? Yes, why not? But they have 
been forbidden already, haven’t they? If the attack happens, this isn’t because 
it is allowed; on the contrary, if allowed this wouldn’t bear any normative 
significance, but would be like the act of arresting a criminal, or “attacking” 
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a river to make a bridge over it. But an attack is possible even if it is not 
“allowed,” as an act of aggression, an unjustified attack. Things that are not 
necessarily allowed are possible to occur. If such an attack was not possible, 
it would not have happened in the first place, and the question of defense 
would not need to be raised at all. But obviously, as a matter of fact, it is 
possible, and in a way the “proof” of this possibility (a very efficient kind of 
proof) is its sporadic but real occurrence. And only then, only if and when it 
occurs, we have a chance to resist or not to resist. The existence of this pos-
sibility is a matter of freedom: we may attack, justifiably or not, “allowed” 
or not. There is no point in “not allowing” or “forbidding” attacking. The 
attack is an accomplished fact, not something that defenders get to decide 
upon – it is something they find as a decision already made: the attacked 
side is not a participant in that decision-making process. Of course, it would 
be best not to be attacked in the first place – and certainly there are many 
possibilities to at least attempt avoid being attacked. However, there is no 
possibility to limit the scope of reasons to be attacked only to those which 
could be excluded by cooperative or conciliatory behavior of prospected 
targets, and to some extent that scope is entirely independent of anything 
in the domain of what the targeted side can do. Despite the fact that many 
things before the attack might be a matter of negotiation or consensus, 
many are not. 
Defense is different: factually it is a matter of decision.28 To presume 
that we must not even try to defend ourselves implies a mechanical obedi-
ence to the clause of forbidding defense, not a decision to surrender: if it was 
a decision, an opposite possibility should have been real (even if it isn’t neces-
sarily chosen in the end). If we remember that the only way to “abolish” war 
(in the sense of making it impossible) is that everybody attacked capitulates 
in advance (which is equivalent to forbidding defense), we come to a strange 
place: war is no longer really possible since defense is forbidden, and attacks 
are not addressed, or mentioned, even if they occur. 
28 This is complex: the attack is directly a matter of decision, the defense however is necessitat-
ed by the attack and even normatively it is not the matter of decision: it is obligatory (there is 
an official obligation to attempt it). But in the context of the ongoing war, i.e. after the point 
at which a war started to unfold, the attack, along with the decision on which it is based on, 
has to be taken as a brute fact. The defense is still a matter of consideration: how far to go in 
attempting to accomplish it. The situation is now reverse: the defenders decide what will be 
the price of war, through determining how much they are prepared to sacrifice in the course 
of defense. The attackers, although they also consider the price they are ready to pay, have 
to accommodate to the determination of the defenders, and even to the point of losing the 
war (as happened to Soviet Union in their war with Finns in 1939-40). Of course, the attackers 
might hope that the defenders will not be very determined – but that is not a matter of their 
choice. They might withdraw (as Americans did in Vietnam), but in a way they are slaves of their 
decision to attack in the first place. 
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So, we face a peculiar dialectic here: war is per definitionem a temporary 
state of affairs which should end, peace is a state of affairs that should last 
– this is on the normative level. On the ontological level, however, the posi-
tions are reverse: peace is a temporary articulation of power, its distribution 
and structure (articulated through laws, as schemes of long term “crystallized 
or frozen” collective will), which will become, sooner or later, unjust and un-
bearable, or otherwise endangered through accumulation of differences and 
changes within or outside that structure. Peace is necessarily fragile and it has 
to be actively defended, by force if necessary. Peace requires effort in order 
to be preserved. However, the prospects of defense are uncertain and varying. 
The effort to preserve peace is not natural, inertial or spontaneous, it is ar-
bitrary, for two reasons which are opposite to each other: first, because of 
the choice ingrained in laws (the fact that the laws could have been different) 
and, second, because the laws are to be taken as “eternal” (sub specie aeter-
nitatis), or “frozen” and normatively constant, not the matter of any current 
decision-making (the laws are the result of past decisions, and have to aspire 
to be valid indefinitely in time, otherwise they could not be enforced). So, 
preservation of peace, and all the efforts to achieve it, necessarily becomes 
unconvincing and implausible at some point. Therefore, peace is, ontological-
ly, from inside, temporary. Changes will accumulate until a new and different 
peace is made, which has to be realized through conflicts, so the only matter 
is whether these conflicts will be resolved in a more or less peaceful manner.
War on the other side, despite being normatively defined as a temporary 
state of affairs, is latently always there: as a kind of energy to resolve con-
flicts in whichever way needed to reach a resolution. In this sense, war is al-
ways an indicator of weakness: there is not enough strength to avoid conflict 
in the first place, and, in the second place, to resolve it quickly and efficiently 
in a peaceful way. War is a failure of the effort to maintain peace. If peace is 
not strong enough, war is always there, latently waiting to “erupt.” However, 
it is also possible that practically some conflicts cannot be resolved at all 
in accordance with the principles forming a particular peace, or, even more 
importantly, that those very principles are at stake and cannot help. In such 
a situation it is possible that a new perception (or just a different perception 
within that particular situation) of what is just and fair will produce the idea 
of affordable means to resolve the conflict. We can suppose that many con-
flicts in fact are resolved in this way, not on the basis of reasons, but on the 
basis of strength, the physical strength or the plausibility of threat of some 
kind. Prejudices and ideologies work that way, and work very efficiently – by 
silencing, suppressing, absorbing or amortizing the conflicts. But it is also 
possible that there are no such means, or that they are not efficient enough, 
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and that conflict will start and continue. This is the point of starting a war, 
as the process in which there is no control of future time, but uncertainty and 
cunning, luck and accidental combinations of circumstances would create the 
network, or context, within which an end would be reached in foreseeable 
time.
In such a case the crucial part is the irreversible point after which con-
flicts would go outside of any or adequate control of the instruments for 
resolving conflicts, instruments which contain the most important parts of 
peace (laws, customs, established expectations, everything taken for grant-
ed like the sense of decency, fashion, etc.), most notably, instruments which 
enable us to make conflicts localized and limited, confined to a definite pe-
riod of time. This is the crucial point: after such an irreversible point, in war, 
there are no deadlines. The presence of this “irreversible point,” a point of 
no return, is what defines war: after that point we have no peace anymore, 
and war, or some such conflict, is the means to either restore the old peace 
or create a new one, but within indefinite time-frame and without definite 
prospect of who will be the victor. In this sense, war is clearly a temporary 
state of affairs, and it has to end at some point. Even in the period of the 
utmost uncertainty of its duration and outcome, it is not presumed to last 
forever. But no deadlines exist. And, as I said, it is latently always there, 
waiting to erupt. 
VII.
Those who win will enjoy their victory (or believe they are enjoying it), and 
those who lose will have to accommodate, if they survive. But they wouldn’t 
survive intact, which was the reason why they defended the status quo ante in 
the first place. The result of the defeat is that the defeated have to change. 
The change might be for their own good, or not (certainly not the same kind 
of good as for the victors), but for them it will be experienced as a loss (in 
addition to the loss they paid already). However, as Max Weber says in “Pol-
itics as Vocation:” 
Instead of searching like old women for the ‘guilty one’ after the 
war – in a situation in which the structure of society produced 
the war – everyone with manly and controlled attitude would 
tell the enemy: ‘We lost the war. You have won it. That is now 
all over. Now let us discuss what conclusions must be drawn ac-
cording to the objective interests that came into play, and what 
is the main thing in view of the responsibility towards the future 
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which above all burdens the victor.’ Anything else is undignified 
and will become a boomerang.29
And then continues: 
A nation forgives if its interests have been damaged, but no na-
tion forgives if its honor has been offended, especially by bigot-
ed self-righteousness. Every new document that comes to light 
after decades revives the undignified lamentations, the hatred 
and scorn, instead of allowing the war at its end to be buried, at 
least morally.30
Every peace is time limited and should be corrected and amended from 
time to time. Most of these emendations occur through defined procedures 
within the structure of peace, but there is always a pure and raw freedom as fi-
nal remedy, as it is the final source of rational life, life as an enterprise of setting 
goals and attempting to realize them. So, war is a latent but real possibility, 
a very expensive and often also unnecessary, immoral, even absurd possibility, 
like so many of such kind we always have within our reach, in the domain of 
our freedom. However, virtually all of these options can in some extraordinary 
circumstances become feasible (like, for example, to cry and shout aloud: it 
would be very improper for me to do that here and now, in the middle of my 
talk for example, but if I am falling from a cliff it would suddenly become very 
proper and feasible). And this shows the power of these irreversible points in 
the course of time: what was in our power before such a point, it is no longer 
there afterwards. 
This is important, because the existence and articulation of responsibility 
depend on it. The scope of possible decision-making is cardinally limited after 
the irreversible point, actually it turns something that was an action into a 
partly pure phenomenon. The irreversible point is a consequence determined 
by the events and actions that happened before: the history of expressing 
opinions, giving declarations, making commitments, the history of political 
activities etc. The final decision might come like a natural event: unavoidable 
and practically necessary. The scope of what can be decided upon is dras-
tically narrowed gradually up to the point after which the decision cannot 
realistically be avoided. 
29 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. 
Hans Heinrich Gerth, and Charles Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 
77-128.
30 Ibid. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 22:17:07 |
[ 28 ]
JOVAN BABIĆ ETHICS OF WAR AND ETHICS IN WAR
This means that the decision to be reached had been articulated and, as a 
matter of fact, became a fait accompli at some prior point, before it has been 
declared. This has obviously important impact on the issue of the responsi-
bility for all subsequent acts and practices, becoming a kind of a context or 
factual premise for them, which is then something that necessarily must be 
taken into account in any attempt to evaluate them.
This is the reason why it is much easier to start a war than to stop it. War 
can be shortened, or prolonged, but stopping it is no longer an option – as it 
isn’t within the scope of our free decision-making anymore. 
The unpleasant conclusion is that war cannot be morally justified, that 
just war theory cannot give the justification for it [as it cannot justify chang-
ing or broadening the concept of “(self) defense” by including in it many 
attractive, ideologically appealing, seemingly compelling, value ingredients 
by excluding the “self” part] – but on the other hand, the participation in war 
is not covered by this judgment. Or taken in a simplified form, we might say 
that morality forbids war, but not necessarily participation in it. Which means 
that ius ad bellum and ius in bello have to be distinguished. Regarding the ius 
ad bellum, which is philosophically far more interesting, my opinion is that, 
morally, the most important matter here is producing causes of future wars. 
However, this is not an easy matter at all, as we cannot know in advance what 
these causes may be – it depends on what will happen afterwards, on accumu-
lation of many small ingredients of the social fabric of values and interests, 
and the structure of beliefs, prejudices, norms, customs, and laws based upon 
them. This is extremely uncomfortable because it implies that we do not and 
cannot know when we produce causes of future wars, future conflicts, or 
adding energy to processes, which can prevent resolution of these conflicts 
by peaceful means. Peace is unstable, it is precious, it requires vigilance, and 
a kind of epistemological modesty and wisdom, contrary to epistemological 
arrogance which characterizes a great part of the contemporary debate on 
these extremely important and sensitive matters. 
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